We survey recent results on the existence of the value in zerosum stopping games with discrete and continuous time, and on the existence of ε-equilibria in non zero-sum games with discrete time.
Introduction
Stopping games have been introduced by Dynkin [4] as a generalization of optimal stopping problems, and later used in several models in economics and management science, such as optimal equipment replacement, job search, consumer purchase behavior, research and development (see Mamer [11] and the references therein), and the analysis of strategic exit (see Ghemawat and Nalebuff [6] or Li [10] ).
The basic setting is as follows. The game is defined by two processes a and b, defined on a probability space (Ω, A, P), endowed with a filtration F. Two players are allowed to stop at any time. The payoff to player 1 is given by one of the two processes depending on who stopped first. Formally, the two players choose stopping times σ and τ and player 1 receives from player 2 the amount E [a σ 1 σ<τ + b τ 1 τ ≤σ,τ <+∞ ] .
Much work has been devoted to the study of this zero-sum game, both in a discrete time and in a continuous time framework. In discrete time, Dynkin [4] proved the existence of the value under an assumption that at any stage only one of the two players is allowed to stop, and Neveu [13] proved the existence of the value under the assumption a ≤ b. After those seminal contributions, most of the literature focused on continuous-time games, in the context of the general theory of stochastic processes. Bismut [1] proved the existence of the value under the assumption a ≤ b and an assumption known as Mokobodsky's hypothesis (in addition, several regularity assumptions are needed). The latter assumption was later removed, see e.g. Lepeltier and Maingueneau [9] . Some authors also worked in the diffusion case, see e.g. Cvitanić and Karatzas [3] . Finally, most work involves a symmetrized payoff function
where c is a third given process, under the assumption a ≤ c ≤ b. This list of references is by no means exhaustive.
Comparatively few studies deal with non-zero-sum (two-player) stopping games. For such games, a, b, c are R 2 -valued processes, and the i-th coordinate is the payoff to player i, see e.g. Mamer [11] , Morimoto [12] , Hideo [7] , and Ohtsubo [14] , [15] .
When the players are restricted to stopping times, the value needs not exist in general, even if the processes are nonrandom and constant. For instance, for the stopping game in discrete time defined by a n = b n = 1 and c n = 0, one has
The purpose of this paper is to survey recent work on stopping games that aim at obtaining the existence of the value under no order conditions on the processes a, b and c, by suitably convexifying the set of strategies of the players.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the appropriate convexification. Sections 3 and 4 present results on zerosum games, respectively for discrete time and continuous time models. In both cases, the proof is sketched in the simple case of deterministic payoff functions. Finally, Section 5 discusses a result on two-player non-zero-sum stoping games with deterministic payoff functions.
Randomized stopping times
This section contains a brief discussion of the proper way of convexifying the set of stopping times. A more extensive treatment can be found in Rosenberg et al. [16] , or Touzi and Vieille [22] . We follow the logic of behavior strategies and enlarge the set of strategies by allowing a player to stop, at any stage, with positive probability.
In discrete time, this leads to the following notion. A strategy (of player 1) is a F-adapted process x = (x n ) with values in [0, 1]. x n is to be interpreted as the probability that player 1 stops the game at stage n, conditional on the game being still alive at that stage. In computing the payoff induced by a pair of strategies (x, y), one assumes that the randomizations performed by the players in the various stages are mutually independent, and independent from the payoff processes. Thus, a strategy x that corresponds to the stopping time σ is
In continuous time, this leads to the following notion. A strategy (of player 1) is a right-continuous, non-decreasing adapted process (F t ) with F t ∈ [0, 1] for each t. Here, F t may be interpreted as the probability that player 1 will have stopped before time t (including t). Thus, the strategy that corresponds to a stopping time σ is the process (F t ) defined as F t = 1 σ≤t . The payoff associated with the two strategies (F t ) and (G t ) can be written as
where ∆F t = F t − F t− is the jump of F at time t.
The alternative standard way of convexifying the set of stopping times is to follow the logic of mixed strategies and to define a strategy as, loosely speaking, a probability distribution over stopping times. The equivalence between mixed strategies and behavior strategies holds under fairly general assumptions, see Kuhn [8] . For a discussion specific to the case of stopping games and to the above notions, see Touzi and Vieille [22] .
Zero-Sum Games in Discrete Time
We here deal with zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. We first describe the setup and the result in a precise way, then give an overview of the proof.
Let (Ω, A, P) be a probability space, and (F n ) be a filtration over (Ω, A, P) (the information available at stage n). Let (a n ), (b n ), (c n ) be adapted processes, defined over (Ω, A, P). We assume
By properly enlarging the probability space (Ω, A, P), one can assume w.l.o.g. that it supports a double sequence (
-measurable, and independent of F n . X n and Y n are used by the players in their randomizations.
Define the stopping game as follows. A strategy for player 1 (resp. player 2) is a [0, 1]-valued adapted process x = (x n ) (resp. y = (y n )). Given strategies (x, y), define the stopping stages of players 1 and 2 by θ 1 = inf{n ≥ 0, X n ≤ x n }, θ 2 = inf{n ≥ 0, Y n ≤ y n }, and set
Thus, θ is the stage at which the game stops. We set
The payoff of the game is γ(x, y) = E(r(x, y)).
The game has a value v ∈ R if
It is convenient to introduce discounted payoffs, as in Yasuda [23] . For λ ∈ (0, 1], the λ-discounted evaluation is given by
The game has a λ-discounted value v λ ∈ R if
Yasuda [23] proved the existence of the discounted value v λ , by adapting Shapley's [17] argument.
Theorem 1 (Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille, [16] ) Every stopping game such that (1) holds has a value v. Moreover, v = lim λ→0 v λ .
We sketch below the proof in the deterministic case; that is, the payoff at each stage n depends only on n. Thus, a n , b n , c n are real numbers. The proof for the general case builds upon the ideas described below.
We denote by G n the game that starts at stage n. G n is similar to the original game, but players are restricted to use strategies that stop before stage n with probability 0. In particular, G 0 coincides with G.
We denote by v n (λ) the λ-discounted value of G n , for each n ∈ N and λ ∈ (0, 1]. Define v n (0) = lim sup λ→0 v n (λ). We shall prove that sup x inf y γ(x, y) ≥ v 0 (0). By exchanging the roles of the two players, one immediately deduces
which implies both conclusions of the Theorem, since sup x inf y γ(x, y) ≤ inf y sup x γ(x, y).
As usual, v n (λ) satisfies a recursive equation (dynamic programming principle), that here takes the form
By possibly taking a subsequence (λ p ) that converges to zero, we may assume that v n (0) = lim λ→0 v n (λ). We let x n (λ) achieve the supremum in (4), and let x n (0) denote any limit point of (x n (λ)) as λ goes to zero. Thus, one has for each y ∈ [0, 1] and every λ ≥ 0,
This can be rephrased by introducing the process ( v n (λ)) n defined, for λ ≥ 0, by
where r θ is equal to a θ , b θ or c θ depending on whether θ 1 < θ 2 , θ 1 > θ 2 or θ 1 = θ 2 < +∞. Note that v n (λ) depends on (x, y), through the value of θ. Though (v n (λ)) is a sequence of numbers, ( v n (λ)) is a process, the randomness being caused by the random choices of the players. Whenever useful, we shall write v x,y n (λ) to emphasize which strategies are used. Inequality (5) can be rephrased as follows: for every choice of strategy y, and for each λ ≥ 0, the process ((1 − λ) min(n,θ) v n (λ)) is a submartingale, provided that player 1 uses the strategy x λ := (x n (λ)).
In particular, the process ( v n (0)) is a submartingale under the pair of strategies (x 0 , 0), where 0 is the strategy of player 2 that never stops. Thus, it converges, P-a.s., to some random variable v ∞ .
We now split the discussion in two parts. Assume first that, under the pair (x 0 , 0), θ is P-a.s. finite. In that case, θ is also P-a.s. finite for (x 0 , y), whatever be y. Thus, for each y, the limit v ∞ coincides with r θ . The submartingale property of v n (0) then implies that γ(
Assume now that θ = +∞ with positive probability, and let ε > 0 be given. On the event {θ = +∞}, v n (0) = v n (0) for each n ∈ N. Therefore, the sequence of numbers v n (0) is convergent, say to v ∞ . If v ∞ ≤ 2ε,
The tricky case is when v ∞ > 2ε. We choose N ∈ N such that |v n (0) − v ∞ | ≤ ε for each n ≥ N . We define a strategy of player 1 as follows. We first construct two sequences (λ p , s p ) (possibly of finite length) by the following recursive device:
•
We let x be the strategy that coincides with x 0 up to stage s 0 = N , and with x λ p+1 from stage s p up to stage s p+1 . Consider what may happen between the two stages s p and s p+1 , assuming that the game was not stopped before stage s p . Whatever be the strategy y used by player 2, the process (1 − λ p+1 ) min(n,θ) v n (λ p+1 ) is a submartingale between s p and s p+1 . Thus, v n (λ p+1 ) increases on average by a factor of 1 1−λ p+1 from one stage to the following, prior to min(θ, s p+1 ). Since v n (λ p+1 ) ≥ ε − ε 2 for n ≤ min(θ, s p+1 ) and all quantities are bounded, it must be that min(θ, s p+1 ) is finite.
Since v s p+1 (λ p+1 ) ≤ ε 2 , the probability that θ < s p+1 (conditioned on θ ≥ s p ) is bounded away from zero, and the payoff to player 1, conditioned on θ ≤ s p+1 , is at least v sp (λ p+1 ) ≥ v ∞ − ε − ε 2 . These observations imply that θ < +∞ P-a.s. under (x, y), for each y, and γ(x, y) ≥ v ∞ − 2ε ≥ v N − 2ε. Since v n (0) is a submartingale under (x 0 , y), this implies that γ(x, y) ≥ v 0 (0) − 2ε.
Zero-Sum Games in Continuous Time
We deal here with zero-sum stopping games in continuous time and with finite horizon. Let (Ω, F, P) be a complete probability space, and T > 0 a fixed terminal time. Let a = {a t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T }, b = {b t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } and c = {c t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be real-valued processes, satisfying the integrability condition
and we denote by F the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by the processes a, b and c. We denote by V + the set of adapted, right-continuous, non-decreasing processes, with values in [0, 1]. For F, G ∈ V + , we set
Theorem 2 (Touzi-Vieille [22] ) Assume that: (i) (a, b, c) satisfy the integrability condition (6), (ii) the game has a finite horizon T , (iii) a and b are (càdlàg) semimartingales with trajectories continuous at T,
i.e., the stopping game has a value .
Note that the assumptions on the processes are not symmetric on the two players. The basic idea of the proof is to apply Sion [19] minmax Theorem to the payoff function γ :
The set S is a Hilbert space when endowed with the scalar product E T 0 F t G t dt , and V + is a subset of S, compact for the weak topology σ(S, S). However, Sion Theorem does not apply directly since the payoff function γ does not have enough continuity properties.
This difficulty is circumvented by applying Sion Theorem to restricted strategy spaces. Define
+ , (F t ) has continuous trajectories, P-a.s.
and
The space S is a Hilbert space when endowed with the scalar product E T 0
can check that V 2 is compact for the weak topology σ(S, S). Moreover, γ is separately continuous on V 1 × V 2 for the strong topology. Hence, by Sion's Theorem sup
The restriction on player 1's strategies is imposed in order to have continuity of γ. The restriction on player 2's strategies is imposed in such a way that restricting the strategy spaces to V 1 and V 2 respectively entail no loss for the players:
, and inf
Let us discuss these two equalities in the non-random case. Thus, a, b and c are right-continuous functions defined on [0, T ], and continuous at T . The proof in the general case is obtained by elaborating upon the ideas that follow.
The first equality is immediate: let (F t ) ∈ V 1 , and (G t ) ∈ V + be given. 
In both cases, it is non-positive, which establishes the first equality.
As for the second equality in (7), let G ∈ V 2 and F ∈ V + be given. By using an argument similar to the one of the previous paragraph, we may assume that F is continuous at T in case a T > 0, b T ≥ 0. Let (F n ) be a sequence of continuous non-decreasing functions such that F n t → F t− for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Using the assumption c ≤ b, one can check that lim sup γ(F n , G) ≥ γ(F, G), which yields the second equality.
Non Zero-Sum Games in Discrete Time
We conclude by presenting a result on two-player non zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. We show how a simple application of Ramsey Theorem, combined with a result of Flesch et al [5] , imply the existence of an ε-equilibrium in the deterministic case.
We let here (a n ), (b n ) and (c n ) be three bounded sequences in R 2 , and let ρ be a uniform bound on the payoffs. The setup of Section 3 then reduces to the following. A strategy of player 1 is a sequence x = (x n ) in [0, 1] , where x n is the probability that player 1 will choose to stop in stage n, if the game was not stopped before.
The payoff of the game is defined to be
as in Section 3, except that here γ(x, y) ∈ R 2 .
Theorem 3 (Shmaya, Solan and Vieille, [18] ) For each ε > 0, the stopping game has an ε-equilibrium (x * , y * ); that is, a pair of strategies that satisfies:
Note that if payoffs are not uniformly bounded, an ε-equilibrium needs not exist. (as a counter example, take the game defined by a 2 ; that is, Z is a finite set such that for every u ∈ [−ρ, ρ]
2 there is z ∈ Z with z − u < ε.
For every two positive integers k < l we define a periodic stopping game G(k, l) as follows:
This is "the game that starts at stage k and restarts at stage l." We denote by γ k,l (x, y) the payoff function in the game G (k, l) .
The game G(k, l) may be analyzed as a particular stochastic game Γ(k, l) with absorbing states. To see this, assume for example k = 0 and l = 2, and consider the stochastic game Γ(0, 2) described by the matrix
In this game player 1 chooses a row and player 2 chooses a column. The first line corresponds to the pure strategy never stop, the second and third ones to the pure strategies stop in stage 0 and stop in stage 1. The columns are to be interpreted symmetrically for player 2. The meaning of an asterisked entry is that the game moves to an absorbing state (i.e., ends) as soon as such an entry is played.
Thus, each stage of Γ(0, 2) corresponds to two stages (a period) of G(0, 2). Using Flesch et al. [5] , the game Γ(k, l) has a stationary ε-equilibrium, or equivalently, for each ε > 0, the game G(k, l) has a periodic ε-equilibrium (x(k, l), y(k, l)), with period l − k.
For each k < l, we choose z(k, l) ∈ Z such that
For every pair of non-negative integers we attached an element in Z -a color. By Ramsey Theorem (see, e.g., Bollobás [2] ) there is an infinite set K ⊆ N ∪ {0} and z ∈ Z such that z(k, l) = z for every k, l ∈ K, k < l. In particular, there exists an increasing sequence of non-negative integers
We define a profile (x, y) from stage k 1 on by concatenating the profiles (x(k i , k i+1 ), y(k i , k i+1 )): (x, y) coincides with (x(k i , k i+1 ), y(k i , k i+1 )) from stage k i up to stage k i+1 − 1. To complete the construction before stage k 1 , we recall that every finite-stage game has an equilibrium. The profile (x, y) coincides between stages 0 and k 1 − 1 with an equilibrium in the k 1 -stage game, whose payoffs are (a n , b n , c n ) n<k 1 if the play is stopped prior to stage k 1 , and is z otherwise. There is no difficulty in proving that (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium of the stopping game, starting from stage k 1 .
1 Moreover, the expected payoff, conditioned that the game was not stopped before stage k 1 , is, up to ε, z. It follows that (x, y) is an ε-equilibrium of the stopping game.
Extensions to more than two players are limited. We actually proved that if every periodic deterministic game admits an ε-equilibrium, then every nonperiodic deterministic game admits an ε-equilibrium. Using the technique of Solan [20] instead of that of Flesch et al [5] , one can prove that every threeplayer periodic deterministic game admits an ε-equilibrium (though it needs not be periodic). One can then prove that every three-player deterministic stopping game admits an ε-equilibrium.
Unfortunately, it is currently not known whether every n-player periodic deterministic stopping game admits an ε-equilibrium, for n ≥ 4. For more details, see Solan and Vieille [21] .
To generalize this proof to general two-player stopping games, one needs to generalize Ramsey Theorem to a stochastic setup, and to show that a concatenation of ε-equilibria in periodic non deterministic games yields an ε -equilibrium, for some ε > 0 that goes to 0 as ε goes to 0. Whereas Ramsey Theorem can be generalized to a stochastic setup, it is not clear yet how to achieve the second goal.
